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2025, 06, No.376 3-20+135
以效率换供应链韧性?:美国供应链重塑政策的效应评估
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国重点产业链供应链韧性和安全水平评估与对策研究”(项目编号:23ZDA032)的阶段性成果
邮箱(Email):
DOI: 10.13516/j.cnki.wes.2025.06.008
摘要:

能否用效率换取供应链韧性?文章构建出一个区分中间品和最终品贸易且包含随机生产率冲击的多国、多部门的一般均衡模型,量化分析了美国推动供应链去中国化、本土化、友岸外包等政策的经济影响。研究表明,美国推动供应链重塑的政策将导致中美两国的福利损失,并对中美中间品贸易产生显著的贸易破坏和贸易偏转效应,同时使得中国的全球价值链嵌入与价值链地位攀升受阻。进一步地,美国供应链重塑政策并不能提升其应对特定负面冲击的经济韧性,包括新冠疫情和来自特定国家的冲击;也无法减轻随机生产率冲击对美国经济造成的总体波动。据此,在贸易开放和全球化生产的背景下,经济效率与韧性并非绝对的替代关系。只有推进更大程度的相互开放,才能真正实现全球产业链供应链体系的韧性和安全。

Abstract:

Can we trade efficiency for supply chain resilience? We develop a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model that distinguishes between intermediate and final goods trade, and incorporates stochastic productivity shocks. This model is used to quantitatively analyze the economic impacts of US policies such as promoting supply chain de-Sinicization, localization, and friend-shoring. The findings indicate that the US policies aimed at reshaping the supply chain will lead to welfare losses for both China and the US. These policies will also have significant trade destruction and trade deflection effects on the intermediate goods trade between the two countries. At the same time, they will impede China′s integration into the global value chain and its upward movement in the value chain. Furthermore, the US supply chain reshaping policies cannot improve US economic resilience against specific negative shocks, including the COVID-19pandemic and shocks from specific countries. Nor can they mitigate the overall fluctuations in the US economy caused by stochastic productivity shocks. Therefore, in the age of trade openness and globalized production, economic efficiency and resilience are not absolute substitutes.Only by promoting greater mutual openness can we truly achieve the resilience and security of the global industrial and supply chain systems.

KeyWords:
参考文献

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(1)资料来源:https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/。

(2)这56个部门涵盖所有农业、制造业和服务业。

(3)请注意,VATL和VATIGL不同来源的总和不等于1(Borin和Mancini,2023),因而将它们与两个总贸易指标进行比较是不合适的。但是,我们可以使用相同的指标来比较不同的进口来源,以衡量其相对重要性。

(4)进一步地,我们放松了这里的核心生产函数假定,将柯布-道格拉斯形式改为更加灵活的不变替代弹性(CES)形式,从而使模型更具一般性。结果发现,本文的估计结果依然是稳健的。限于篇幅,此部分内容留存备索。

(5)进一步地,我们区分了中间品和最终品贸易弹性参数,使得模型更具一般性,发现其估计结果是与基准回归的结果是相吻合的。限于篇幅,估计结果留存备索。

(6)WIOD中与关键行业和产品相关的部门包括:作物和动物生产,狩猎和相关服务活动,采矿和采石,食品、饮料和烟草制品的制造,焦炭和精炼石油产品的制造,化学品和化学产品的制造,基本药物产品和药物制剂的制造,其他非金属矿物产品的制造,基本金属的制造,金属制品的制造(机械和设备除外),计算机、电子和光学产品的制造,电气设备的制造,机械和设备的制造,机动车辆、拖车和半挂车的制造,其他运输设备的制造。

(7)资料来源:https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ERP-2022.pdf。

(8)在操作中,我们设定 ■进行计算。

(9)Antràs和Chor(2018)的研究表明,DI■或UI■在部门层面的加权平均值与■或■之间的差异在数值上很小。

①资料来源:https://www. gov. cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681. htm。

②资料来源:https://bidenwhitehouse. archives. gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/。

基本信息:

DOI:10.13516/j.cnki.wes.2025.06.008

中图分类号:F125;F171.2

引用信息:

[1]沈国兵,沈彬朝.以效率换供应链韧性?:美国供应链重塑政策的效应评估[J].世界经济研究,2025,No.376(06):3-20+135.DOI:10.13516/j.cnki.wes.2025.06.008.

基金信息:

国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国重点产业链供应链韧性和安全水平评估与对策研究”(项目编号:23ZDA032)的阶段性成果

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